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FEDERAL REGULATION: THE NEW REGIMEN 
Joseph D. Alviani* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On February 18,1981, President Reagan addressed a joint session 
of Congress to announce his administration's "Plan for Economic 
Recovery." A great deal of publicity preceded the public announce-
ment, much of it generated effectively by the White House public 
relations corps in an effort to harness early support for the planned 
budget and tax cutting measures. Also included in the plan, but sub-
ject to only brief mention in the formal announcement, was a change 
in direction for the federal regulatory process-the new administra-
tion's method for "getting government off the back of business." 
For one listening to the President, and with a cursory knowledge of 
Executive Order 12,0441 and the Regulatory Flexibility Act,2 the 
outlined revision did not seem dramatic. The spoken word, however, 
did not fully disclose the magnitude of the change as codified in Ex-
* J.D. Harvard Law School, 1970. Mr. Alviani is a staff member of the Regulatory Impact 
Analysis Unit in the Operations Research Section of Arthur D. Little, Inc. Prior to joining 
Arthur D. Little, Mr. Alviani served as Corporation Counsel for the City of Boston. 
1. Exec. Order No. 12,044, 3 C.F.R. 152 (1978); extended by Presidential action, 45 Fed. 
Reg. 44,249 (1980). This was President Carter's effort to create a review mechanism which 
would balance the potential costs of regulatory action against anticipated benefits. For a 
detailed discussion of Executive Order 12,044 see text at notes 7-15 infra. This Order was 
revoked by Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981). 
2. The Regulatory Flexibility Act, Pub. L. No. 96-354, 94 Stat. 1165 (1980) (codified in 5 
U.S.C. S§ 601-602), was Congress' response to complaints from small businesses that some 
federal regulations were having a disproportionate cost impact on their operations. The Act 
requires publication of a regulatory flexibility analysis describing the impact of new regula-
tions on small businesses. 
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ecutive Order 12,2913 promulgated by the President on February 17, 
1981, the day prior to his address to Congress. 
The following is an effort to outline and provide initial analysis of 
the implications of the Reagan Executive Order on Federal Regula-
tion. 4 It cannot be precise or complete, because many items are still 
subject to further procedures to be issued by the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget (OMB) and the Presidential Task Force on Regula-
tory Relief (Task Force), and to judicial interpretation of provisions 
which are unclear or subject to challenge. Given those reservations, 
however, an early analysis of the changes in practical procedures 
and philosophy is well worthwhile. 
II. PHILOSOPHICAL AND STRUCTURAL CHANGES 
IN THE REGULATORY PROCESS 
To appreciate fully the changes in the federal regulatory process 
occasioned by the publication of Executive Order 12,291, a brief 
history of its antecedents is helpful. 
Federal efforts to streamline, improve, or reform the mechanisms 
for developing, reviewing, and promulgating federal regulations are 
not unique to the new administration. In fact, all three administra-
tions preceding President Reagan's took steps with varying degrees 
of commitment and success to make the process more efficient. 
Executive Order 11,8216 was issued by President Ford in 1974 to 
assure that "all major legislative proposals, regulations, and rules 
emanating from the executive branch of the Government include a 
statement certifying that the inflationary impact of such actions on 
the Nation [has] been carefully considered."6 Responsibility for coor-
dinating this endeavor was assigned to the Director of OMB, who 
3. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981). 
4. Executive Order 12,291 and its predecessors are consistent in exempting the following 
rules from applications of review procedures: 
a. regulations issued in accordance with the formal rule making provisions of the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. S§ 556, 557 (1980) (formal hearing and ad-
judication procedures required by statute, resulting in formulation of an order), 
b. regulations issued with respect to a military or foreign affairs function of the 
United States, 
c. matters related to agency organization, management, or personnel. 
[d. These exceptions have been developed over time and reflect practical and legal concerns. 
The Administrative Procedure Act itself incorporated the military or foreign affairs and inter-
nal management exceptions. 
5. Exec. Order No. 11,821, 39 Fed. Reg. 41,501 (1974). 
6. This terminology was revised in 1976 by Exec. Order No. 11,949, 42 Fed. Reg. 1,017 
(1977), to require the filing of an "economic impact statement." 
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was to make every effort to link inflationary review with his budget 
preparation, legislative clearance, and management evaluation func-
tions. 
This approach built on the procedures established by President 
Nixon in which OMB was to serve as the general clearinghouse for 
executive department and agency initiatives. While both the Nixon 
and Ford measures enhanced the political authority of OMB, neither 
removed from agency heads the ultimate authority for the direction 
and final approval of regulations. These initiatives did, however, 
begin to introduce criteria intended to measure cost impact on con-
sumers, businesses, markets, or federal, state, or local government; 
effects on productivity of wage earners, businesses, or governments 
at any level; effects on competition; and effects on supplies of impor-
tant products or services. 
Despite the noblest intentions, however, with the passage of time 
the Director of OMB became engaged in a variety of matters which 
diverted attention from the review process. It soon became apparent 
that many of the responsibilities imposed by Executive Order 11,821 
on OMB would be delegated to the same agency heads who had 
thought it wise to originate the regulations in the first place. This 
resulted in continued criticism by industry representatives that the 
process of promulgating new regulations was unresponsive to 
business' costs of compliance. 
President Carter assumed office in January, 1976 after a cam-
paign which emphasized a return to "grass roots" democracy and a 
reduction of the intrusive role of the federal government on small 
business. However, by the time the new President shored up a dis-
astrous start with the Congress and addressed higher priority 
domestic and foreign policy issues, it was March, 1978 before formal 
attention could be directed toward improving government regula-
tions. Executive Order 12,044 was promulgated on March 23, 1978, 
and was intended to establish procedures which would insure clarity, 
prevent unnecessary burdens on the economy, individuals, or public 
and private entities, and allow for monitoring and evaluation of the 
regulatory reform effort. 7 
The specific objectives of Executive Order 12,044 were to be 
achieved through a system which assured: 
• the determination of a clear need for and purpose of the 
regulation, 
7. For a review of the comments submitted in response to publication of the draft of Ex-
ecutive Order 12,044, see 43 Fed. Reg. 12,265 (1978). 
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• effective oversight by heads of agencies and policy officials, 
• an opportunity for early participation and comment by other 
Federal agencies, State and local governments, businesses, 
organizations, and individual members of the public, 
• analysis of alternative regulatory approaches prior to is-
suance, 
• minimization of compliance costs, paperwork and other 
burdens on the public. 8 
Agencies were required to revise their existing procedures to com-
ply with the objectives of the Executive Order. At a very minimum 
these procedures were to include provisions for (1) publication of se-
miannual agendas of regulations (to give the public adequate notice 
of regulations under consideration, but soon to be published); (2) ap-
propriate agency head oversight (to insure proper consideration of 
alternative approaches and costs); (3) opportunity for early and 
meaningful public participation (by publishing an advance notice of 
proposed rule making, holding open conferences or hearings, sending 
notices of proposed regulations to publications likely to be read by 
those affected, notifying interested parties directly); and (4) develop-
ment of a system for approving "significant" regulations. 9 
Resolution of two questions determined whether the regulatory 
analysis requiremenpo of Executive Order 12,044 was activated. 
First, was the regulation "significant?" Second, if "significant," 
were the economic consequences so major as to mandate a full 
regulatory analysis? To determine whether a regulation was signifi-
cant, agencies were instructed to establish criteria which considered: 
• the type and number of individuals, businesses, organizations, 
State and local governments affected, 
• the compliance and reporting requirements likely to be in-
volved, 
• direct and indirect effects of the regulation including the ef-
fect on competition, 
• the relationship of the regulation to those of other programs 
and agencies. 11 
If after measuring a regulation by these criteria, an agency head 
determined that it was "significant," a further review was to be 
undertaken to assess whether its economic consequences were so 
major that a regulatory analysis was required. Specifically, such 
8. Exec. Order No. 12,044, § 1, 3 C.F.R. 152 (1978). 
9. Exec. Order No. 12,044, § 2, 3 C.F.R. 153 (1978). 
10. [d. § 3(a)(b), 3 C.F.R. 154·155. (See discussion in text at notes 12-13 infra). 
11. [d. § 2(e), 3 C.F.R. 154 (1978)_ 
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analysis would be necessary for all regulations which resulted in: "(a) 
an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more; or (b) a ma-
jor increase in costs or prices for individual industries, levels of 
government or geographic regions."12 
In a very general way, Executive Order 12,044 established guide-
lines for the content of the regulatory analysis, consisting of: 
• a succinct statement of the problem, 
• a general description of the major alternative ways of dealing 
with the problem that were considered by the agency, 
• an analysis of the economic consequences of each alternative, 
• a detailed explanation of the reason for choosing one alter-
native over the others.13 
While in one sense this provision provided more specificity than re-
quired by any previous directive, it still placed primary responsibility 
for the process in agency heads. In addition, while a movement 
toward balancing economic costs with benefits could be discerned, 
broad discretion remained for continued regulation in areas where 
costs and benefits were neither quantifiable nor measurable. Finally, 
an "ethical" impetus toward regulation of certain areas of activity 
(e.g., workers' health and safety) regardless of costs was within the 
permissible scope of agency action. 
In an effort to insure effective implementation of the procedures 
for improving the regulatory process Executive Order 12,044 dele-
gated to OMB the power to review and approve the processes de-
signed by agencies to comply with Executive Order provisions. Con-
sequently, while OMB could affect the initial procedural response of 
agencies to the Executive Order and was accorded an ongoing over-
sight role of the process, it could not influence the content or effect of 
individual regulations on a continuing case-by-case basis. 
To supplement the specific changes made in the regulatory review 
process by Executive Order 12,044, President Carter established the 
U.S. Regulatory Council later in 1978. The Council consisted of 
thirty-eight departments and agencies with major regulatory 
responsibilities. Its mandate was to improve coordination of federal 
regulatory activities and encourage more effective management of 
the regulatory process. During its two-year existence, the Regula-
tory Council made some headway in organizing interagency efforts 
to manage better the regulatory environment, improve regulatory 
12. Id. § 3(a)(I), 3 C.F.R. 154. 
13. Id. § 3(b)(1), 3 C.F.R. 154. 
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efforts such as economic analysis and evaluation, and encourage in-
novative, market-oriented approaches to regulation. Despite these 
achievements, however, critics believed that the Council merely 
served to reinforce the traditional regulatory philosophy of its 
members, and did nothing to reduce the burdensome costs of undue 
regulation on business. 
Industry representatives, supported by leading supply side econo-
mists and conservative legislators, began promoting the need for a 
novel approach toward the federal regulatory process-one in which 
economic factors, reflected in terms such as "cost-benefit analysis," 
"net aggregate cost to society," and "regulatory budgeting," 
became prevalent.14 These advocates lobbied for a position which 
would require federal agencies to surmount rigorous burdens of 
economic proof prior to promulgating new regulations. They found a 
willing champion in Ronald Reagan. When he was elected President, 
it was clear that a change in the philosophical bases of federal regula-
tion would ensue. Nine days after his inauguration, the President 
issued a Memorandum16 postponing for sixty days the effective date 
of all final rules. 
The introductory paragraph of the Memorandum is instructive: 
Among my priorities as President is the establishment of a new 
regulatory oversight process that will lead to less burdensome 
and more rational federal regulation. I am now directing certain 
measures that will give this Administration, through the Task 
Force on Regulatory Relief, sufficient time to implement that 
process, and to subject to full and appropriate review many of 
the prior Administration's last-minute decisions that would in-
crease rather than relieve the current burden of restrictive 
regulation. This review is especially necessary in the economic 
climate we have inherited. l6 
Executive Order 12,291 embodied this new philosophy and reflects 
two major shifts in approach toward federal regulation: 
First, a practical shift of ultimate oversight and monitoring 
authority from agency heads to the Director of OMB, with specific 
measures to insure OMB's policing role. 
14. One result of this lobbying effort was the passage in 1980 of the Regulatory Flexibility 
Act, Pub. L. No. 96-354, 94 Stat. 1165 (1980) (codified in 5 U.S.C. SS 601-612)-an attempt to 
incorporate an economic impact statement for small businesses in the regulatory analysis proc-
ess. 
15. Memorandum of January 29, 1981, "Postponement of Pending Regulations," 46 Fed. 
Reg. 11,227 (1981). 
16.Id. 
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Second, a less than subtle shift in the quantity and quality of 
evidence required to justify promulgation of new rules and regula-
tions. This reflects a change in philosophy from emphasis on general 
humanistic and social goals, i.e., "doing good," "protecting workers," 
"insuring health and safety" to a more measurable "balancing test" 
heavily weighted toward considerations of economic costs and bene-
fits, i.e., effects on productivity, competition, "is doing good in this 
manner worth the specific costs to society as a whole?" 
This new approach toward federal regulation is entirely consistent 
with the general theory of the Reagan Administration that govern-
ment over the last two decades has exceeded its responsibility by at-
tempting to affect social change, and by tampering unduly with the 
economic system. This dogma permits governmental action only if it 
is clearly demonstrated that intervention is economically sound, and 
that the method of regulation is the least costly to the affected in-
dustry and society. It does not deny the obligation of government to 
provide for the general welfare, but it narrows the scope of those 
areas in which government has a responsibility to intrude, and im-
poses upon the government, once it has decided to intervene, the 
burden of substantiating that its approach is the most cost efficient. 
This is in stark contrast to the philosophy of the New Deal, New 
Frontier, and Great Society programs which imposed upon the 
federal government the duty to affect change in a wide variety of 
social and economic affairs with economic costs and benefits playing 
a minimal role in the decision to achieve the objective. 
While Executive Order 12,044 began a gradual movement toward 
a recognition of costs, benefits, and economic impact in the regula-
tion promulgation process, it nevertheless retained the traditional 
Democratic approach of broad federal regulatory intervention to 
protect perceived public interests. Executive Order 12,291, on the 
other hand, reverses this premise, compelling the government to be 
selective when it intervenes and then to adopt the regulatory alter-
native which is least costly regardless of the marginal losses to in-
creased hazards, environmental deterioration, and a less than totally 
safe workplace. The bottom line of this notion is that people have a 
right to trade off health, safety, and environmental integrity for 
greater productivity and employment, and that government has no 
right to prohibit them to so choose. 
With this understanding of the bases for the revision in mind, an 
examination of the specific provisions of the Executive Order 
demonstrates the practical consequences for the regulators and the 
regulated. 
292 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 9:285 
III. SECTION-By-SECTION REVIEW OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 12,291 
A. Definitions 
As noted above in the discussion of Executive Order 12,044, the 
classification of a regulation as "significant" or "major" has the ef-
fect of activating the provisions mandating detailed regulatory 
analysis. This imposes on administrative agencies added costs for 
legal, economic, and clerical skills, injects OMB into the agency's 
business, extends the time for comment, and consequently delays 
final publication and the effective date of the rule. While Executive 
Order 12,044 established minimal criteria for categorizing a rule as 
"significant," not all "significant" rules required full regulatory 
analysis. Only "significant" rules which "would result" in the follow-
ing had to undergo analysis: (1) an annual effect on the economy of 
$100 million or more; or (2) a major increase in costs or prices for in-
dividual industries, levels of government, or geographic regions. 17 
Reagan's Executive Order substantially modifies this classification 
scheme. First, it alters the language introducing the definitional 
criter .... by substituting a "likelihood of result" test for the certainty 
contained in Executive Order 12,044.18 Namely, a significant (or 
"major") rule means any regulation that is likely to result in specific 
economic events, rather than a regulation which "would result" in 
those same events. 
Second, while Executive Order 12,291 retains the two criteria of 
its predecessors, it adds another criterion which substantially 
broadens the definition, specifically: (3) significant adverse effects 
on competition, employment, investment, productivity, innovation, 
or on the ability of United States-based enterprises to compete with 
foreign-based enterprises in domestic or export markets. 19 
Although we must await OMB's interpretation and clarification of 
the operative word significant in the new criterion before making 
predictions of its impact, it is not ludicrous to suggest that few in-
dustries will have difficulty in establishing strong cases that new 
regulations will adversely affect their competitive position, produc-
tivity, investment, or market position vis-a-vis foreign competitors. 
It appears that this provision was designed specifically to envelope a 
wide range of new regulations into the process of regulatory analysis 
which would not have been included under Executive Order 12,044. 
17. Exec. Order No. 12,044, § 3(aX1), 3 C.F.R. 154 (1978). 
18. [d. § 1(b), 3 C.F.R. 152. 
19. Exec. Order No. 12,291, § 1(bX3), 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981). 
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The total effect of these modifications is to expand the definition of 
major rule, thereby incorporating a greater number of regulations 
within the OMB review process, and limiting agency discretion. As 
will be observed below, these changes when combined with the 
authority of OMB to reverse an agency head's determination that a 
rule is non-major20 leave few rules free of the costs and burdens of 
the cumbersome review process. 
The definition section of Executive Order 12,291 is also the first in-
troduction to the Presidential Task Force on Regulatory Relief, 
which is expected to assume a coordinating role with OMB in moni-
toring compliance with the procedures set forth in the order. While 
the language of the Order actually implies a more prominent role for 
the Task Force, namely to review and approve of OMB activities pur-
suant to the Order, the likely result is that primary responsibility for 
enforcing compliance will reside in OMB. It is noteworthy that prom-
inent members of the Task Force include Vice President George 
Bush, David Stockman, Director of OMB, and Murray Wiedenbaum, 
the Chairman of the Council on Economic Advisers, all of whom have 
long been critical of excess government regulation of business. 
B. General Requirements 
Further indications of the significant change presaged by the Ex-
ecutive Order appear in "Section 2. General Requirements." Both 
Executive Orders 12,044 and 12,291 arguably promote a systema-
tized process for promulgating and reviewing proposed and existing 
regulations to alleviate unnecessary, expansive, and duplicative 
burdens. The new procedure, however, is more specifically directed 
toward quantifiable economic criteria for weighing "burdens." For 
example, Executive Order 12,044 set minimum standards to be in-
cluded in an agency head's review of regulations, including need, 
direct and indirect effects, alternative approaches, choice of the least 
burdensome alternative, public comments, and estimates of new 
reporting burdens or recordkeeping requirements. 21 The actual 
details of incorporating these factors into the process, and the impor-
tance attributed to each, however, remained within the domain of 
the agency head. As long as the review was undertaken within the 
framework established by these performance standards, agency 
heads could exercise relatively unfettered regulatory authority. Ex-
20. See text at notes 23-34 infra. 
21. Exec. Order No. 12,044, § 2(dX1)-(8), 3 C.F.R. 153-154 (1978). 
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ecutive Order 12,291, on the other hand, requires adherence to the 
following detailed considerations: 
• administrative decisions shall be based on adequate informa-
tion concerning the need for and consequences of proposed 
government action; 
• regulatory action shall not be undertaken unless the potential 
benefits to society from the regulation outweigh the potential 
costs to society; 
• regulatory objectives shall be chosen to maximize the net 
benefits to society; 
• among alternative approaches to any given regulatory objec-
tive, the alternative involving the least net cost to society shall 
be chosen; 
• agencies set regulatory priorities with the aim of maximizing 
the aggregate net benefits to society, taking into account the 
condition of the particular industries affected by regulations, 
the condition of the national economy, and other regulatory ac-
tions contemplated for the future. 22 
These revisions reflect more than semantic differences. Except for 
the first two considerations, there is little, if any, resemblance be-
tween these enumerated factors and those contained in Executive 
Order 12,044. Even where a similarity can be discovered, the utiliza-
tion of more technical economic terminology discretely transforms 
the regulatory implications of the requirement. Although an argu-
ment may be made that agencies do, in fact, already consider these 
effects in undertaking their regulatory analysis, it is nevertheless 
certain that codification of these requirements in the Executive 
Order with mandatory standards and burdens of proof, creates a for-
mal prerequisite that final promulgation of rules must be preceded 
by evidence sufficient to satisfy each of the standards. Industry no 
longer has to rely upon lobbying and negotiating skills to coax agen-
cies into recognizing the effects of regulatory action upon competi-
tion, the economy, or their distinct operations. They can now public-
ly and perhaps judicially challenge agency action which fails to ade-
quately consider these factors. In addition, at least two new sympa-
thetic forums-OMB and the Task Force-are provided in which 
regulated industries may take their "appeals." Simply stated, the 
need for economic and legal analysis will expand as agencies are 
compelled to respond to standards requiring evidence sufficient to 
22. Exec. Order No. 12,291, S 2(a}-(e), 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981) (emphasis added). 
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prove that it is more likely than not that proposed regulations will 
not have the claimed detrimental effect on competition, the 
economy, or the relative position of U.S.-based industry in foreign 
markets. 
c. Regulatory Impact Analysis and Review 
To implement the general requirements of section 2 of the Ex-
ecutive Order and to insure a primary role for OMB, a completely 
revised process for conducting regulatory impact analysis and 
review is proposed in section 3. 
Generally speaking, the new approach requires initial agency 
determination whether a rule it intends to propose or to issue is a 
major rule, subject to the novel authority of OMB (1) to order that a 
rule not so initially determined be treated as a major rule,23 and (2) to 
require any set of related rules to be considered together as a major 
rule.24 Specific procedures and time frames for preparation and sub-
mission to OMB of a Regulatory Impact Analysis are also defined. 
The added power granted to OMB by the Executive Order reduces 
significantly the role of agency heads in final determination of what 
regulations will be proposed.25 It centralizes ultimate decision mak-
ing in OMB, and may effectively curtail the number of regulations 
actually proposed or issued. This curtailment is a function of two fac-
tors-one practical, one political. Practically, given budget cuts, 
freezes on federal hiring and consulting contracts, agencies simply 
may not have sufficient personnel or technical expertise to meet the 
augmented requirements. Politically speaking, agency heads will 
only gamble on promulgation of major rules which clearly satisfy Ex-
ecutive Order standards so as to avoid a public and private "hand 
slapping," by OMB acting for the President. 
23. For a discussion of the implications of classifying a rule as a major rule, see text at notes 
17-20 supra. 
24. Exec. Order No. 12,291, S 3(b), 46 Fed. Reg. 13,194 (1981). 
25. The reasons for centralizing responsibility for regulatory review in OMB may have 
originated in the historical use of OMB as a clearinghouse for executive branch proposals, or 
more logically because OMB has access to budgetary information of each agency and also has a 
head start in coordinating executive branch activity when it prepares the federal budget. It is 
probably more adept at tracking the relationships between regulatory schemes adopted by 
various agencies with overlapping substantive jurisdiction of regulated industries. 
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The specific procedures for Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) and 
Review prescribed by Executive Order 12,291 are as follows (see 
Figure 1): 
(1) Agencies shall prepare RIA's for all major rules subject to 
the Executive Order and transmit them, along with all 
notices of proposed rulemaking26 and all final rules to the 
Director of OMB, in the following manner: 
(a) if no notice of proposed rule making is to be published for 
a proposed major rule (which is not an emergency rule), 
only a final RIA is to be prepared, and transmitted to 
OMB (with rule) at least 60 days prior to publication of 
the major rule as a final rule; 
(b) all other major rules require preparation of a pre-
liminary RIA, and transmission, along with a notice of 
proposed rulemaking, to OMB at least 60 days prior to 
publication of a notice of proposed rulemaking; and a 
final RIA, transmitted to OMB (along with the final 
rule), at least 30 days prior to publication of the major 
rule as a final rule; 
(c) for all rules other than major rules, agencies shall submit 
to OMB, every notice of proposed rule making and final 
rule, at least 10 days prior to publication.27 
(2) An RIA must contain: 
(a) a description of the potential benefits of the rule, in-
cluding any beneficial effects that cannot be quantified in 
monetary terms, and the identification of those likely to 
receive the benefits; 
(b) a description of the potential costs of the rule, including 
any adverse effects that cannot be quantified in mone-
tary terms, and the identification of those likely to bear 
the costs; 
(c) a determination ofthe potential net benefits28 of the rule, 
including an evaluation of effects that cannot be quan-
tified in monetary terms; 
(d) a description of alternative approaches that could 
substantially achieve the same regulatory goal at lower 
cost, together with an analysis of the potential benefit 
and costs and a brief explanation of the legal reasons why 
such alternatives, if proposed, could not be adopted, and 
26. A notice of proposed rule making is usually (except in those cases where agencies pro-
mulgate an advanced notice) the first public indication by an agency that it plans to follow the 
informal rule making procedure (promulgation of regulations in the Federal Register and 
solicitation of comments). This is distinct from formal rulemaking procedure which requires 
trial-like presentation of positions before an administrative tribunal with formal rules of 
evidence, etc. 
27. Exec. Order No. 12,291, § 3(c)(I)-(3), 46 Fed. Reg. 13,194 (1981) (emphasis added). 
28. Potential net benefits may be defined as the quantifiable, measurable or reasonably ex-
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(e) unless covered by the description required [above], an ex-
planation of any legal reasons why this rule cannot be 
based on the requirements set forth in Section 2 of the 
Order. 29 
These RIA content requirements lead to some interesting specula-
tion. The emphasized language seems to refine the requirement in 
section 2 of the Executive Order relating to choice of the regulatory 
alternative involving the "least net cost to society." Since the 
phrase, "legal reasons" is used twice, it may be concluded that the 
only justifiable cause (other than the case of "emergency" rules) for 
not choosing the alternative involving the least net cost to society is 
a specific legal impediment which does not permit adoption of that 
alternative. This might take the form of a statutory or constitutional 
limitation, such as requirements of due process, or the prohibition on 
exercising authority beyond the agency's delegation of power by the 
Congress. Whatever the specific legal reason, these revisions seem 
to eliminate any consideration of practical feasibility, or reliance on 
any instinctive belief that one method will protect workers or insure 
safety or guarantee compliance better than a marginally less costly 
alternative. As a consequence, lawyers for regulated industries and 
regulating agencies will be pressed to exercise significant ingenuity 
in finding legal reasons to justify or condemn regulatory alternatives 
depending on their perspectives. 
(3) The Director of OMB, subject to the direction of the Task 
Force, which is authorized to resolve any conflicts arising under 
Executive Order 12,291 or present them to the President, is em-
powered to review all preliminary or final RIA's, notices of pro-
posed rule making, or final rules required by the new order. so 
Agencies may assume that OMB has concluded its review unless 
they are advised to the contrary by OMB: 
For major rules: • within 60 days of a submission of a final 
RIA where no notice of proposed rulemak-
ing is contemplated, or a submission of a 
preliminary RIA with a notice of proposed 
rulemaking; 
• within 30 days of the submission of a final 
RIA and a final rule; and 
pected, even if not measurable, benefits of a regulation (e.g., savings in medical costs, lost 
earnings, lives, environmental deterioration, etc.) less the costs of the regulation (e.g., agency 
and industry costs of compliance, lost productivity, lost employment, etc.). 
29. Exec. Order No. 12,291, S 3(d)(1)-(5), 46 Fed. Reg. 13,194 (1981) (emphasis added). 
30. Id. § 3(eX1), 46 Fed. Reg. 13,194. 
31. Id. § 3(eX2XA)-(C), 46 Fed. Reg. 13,194-95. 
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For rules other • within 10 days of the submission of a notice 
than major rules: of proposed rulemaking on a final rule. 31 
The Director of OMB is empowered to require an agency to consult 
with OMB concerning the review of a preliminary RIA or notice of 
proposed rulemaking. During this period the agency is prohibited 
from formal publication of its preliminary RIA or notice of proposed 
rule making (subject to a conflict with deadlines imposed by statute 
or judicial order).32 Further, if an agency receives notice that the 
Director of OMB intends to submit views with respect to any final 
RIA or final rule, it must refrain from publishing its final RIA or 
final rule until it has (a) responded to OMB's views, and (b) incor-
porated those views and the agency's response in the rulemaking 
file. 33 In effect, OMB may freeze preliminary RIA's and publication 
of notices of proposed rulemaking by demanding consultation, and 
may delay pUblication of final rules by submitting views. 
Although Executive Order 12,291 suggests that application of 
these powerful controls over agencies is conditioned by the proviso 
that nothing in the subsection "shall be construed as displacing the 
agencies' responsibilities delegated by law,"34 the likelihood is 
strong that these provisions along with the authority of OMB to 
reverse an agency head's determination whether a rule is major will 
be the subject of litigation. 
The rules of law regarding congressional delegation of power to 
administrative agencies are complex and usually very narrowly in-
terpreted. It is not unreasonable to argue that the Executive Order 
has bypassed Congress in usurping delegated agency powers and 
alloting them to OMB. On the other hand, defenders of the Executive 
Order can respond that it is merely an internal management tool, 
and nowhere is veto power over agency action granted to OMB. 
Whatever the final resolution of this conflict, a few conclusions are 
inescapable. First, regardless of the letter of the Executive Order, 
agency heads will likely refrain from direct confrontation with OMB 
and the President over regulations which only minimally comply 
32. It is unlikely that the prohibition on publication would preclude agencies which presently 
undertake "predraft" consultations with affected industries from continuing that process. In 
fact, the focus of the new Administration may be to encourage more informal industry par-
ticipation in the regulatory process. It is safe to conclude that "publication" or 
"promulgation" when used in the Executive Order means publication or promulgation in the 
Federal Register. 
33. Exec. Order No. 12,291, § 3(f)(2), 46 Fed. Reg. 13,195 (1981). 
34. Id. § 3, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,194-95. 
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with the new criteria. Second, the ability of OMB to freeze or 
substantially delay promulgation of rules is a powerful weapon for 
compelling agency heads to redefine or redirect the objectives of in-
dividual regulations. If neither of these results is technically a usur-
pation of delegated power, both will in actuality emasculate the 
authority of agency heads. 
The remainder of section 3 addresses the content of notices of pro-
posed rulemaking, the availability of preliminary and final RIA's to 
the public, and review of currently existing rules. A more detailed 
comment on the provisions concerning review of currently existing 
rules is appropriate, particularly since these revisions contribute to 
the enhancement of OMB's power at the expense of the authority of 
agency heads. 
Agencies are required by Executive Order 12,291 to initiate 
reviews of currently effective rules and perform RIA's of existing 
major rules.85 To "assist" this activity, the Order authorizes OMB, 
subject to the direction of the Task Force, to designate currently ef-
fective rules for review and establish schedules for their review and 
analysis.86 This powerful tool is inserted into the Execu.tive Order 
where it is unlikely to generate a great deal of attention. However, 
the implications are critical. OMB may designate for review (under 
the standards of the new Executive Order) currently existing rules 
which were appropriately approved pursuant to then effective re-
quirements. Current rules must now surmount new burdens of costJ 
benefit justification, and to survive, must prove to be the least costly 
alternatives to achieve the regulatory objective. It would not be too 
speculative to conclude that many of the rules found to be most 
burdensome to industry will be selected by OMB for rejustification. 
D. Regulatory Review 
The increase in the nature and amount of substantiation required 
to sustain regulatory action is also evident in "Section 4, Regulatory 
Review." In two short paragraphs, the Executive Order creates 
what is in essence a "full employment act for lawyers." The section 
requires that: 
Before approving any final major rule, each agency shall: 
(a) Make a determination that the regulation is clearly within 
the authority delegated by law and consistent with congres-
sional intent, and include in the Federal Register at the time 
35. [d. § 3(i), 46 Fed. Reg. 13,195. 
36. [d .. 
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of promulgation a memorandum of law supporting that 
determination. 
(b) Make a determination that the factual conclusions upon 
which the rule is based have substantial support in the agency 
record, viewed as a whole, with full attention to public com-
ments in general and the comments of persons directly af 
fected by the rule in particular. 37 
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These provisions certainly require more than the perfunctory atten-
tion given to legal authority in present rules. In addition, paragraph 
(b) employs the technical legal standard for judicial approval of agen-
cy action on appeal, namely, that "factual conclusions have substan-
tial support in the agency record."38 Although this standard pre-
serves the responsibility of reviewing courts to carefully scrutinize 
the record to insure that conclusions drawn accurately reflect 
evidence in the record, if the "substantial evidence" criterion is 
satisfied the factual findings of agencies will normally be treated as 
presumptively correct, limiting review to matters of law. Failure to 
find such evidence, however, permits the court to review the facts ab 
initio. 39 Since it is assumed that most administrative agencies 
presently take steps to insure that the record of agency action has 
sufficient factual support for its conclusions, this requirement of the 
Executive Order will not be overly burdensome. But, the questions 
remain whether agencies must now have the kind of sufficient 
evidence required by the Exective Order in its record to sustain its 
judgment, what weight a reviewing court will accord the new proce-
dures, and whether the quality of evidence supported in the record 
must be that described in the Executive Order to pass judicial 
muster. Contributing to the confusion is the fact that the "substan-
tial evidence" standard is traditionally applied to formal adjudi-
catory rulemaking only, not informal rulemaking. Whether the Ex-
ecutive Order is presuming to establish a new standard, and whether 
reviewing courts will heed that standard must await future judicial 
decisionmaking. But certainly, it is uncontestable that the "substan-
tial evidence" criteria imposes a heavier burden on agency action, 
even if only for internal administration purposes. 
The remainder of the section proposes a guide for weighing factual 
evidence: first, weight must be given to general public comments; 
37. [d. S 4(a)-(b), 46 Fed. Reg. 13,195 (emphasis added). 
38. "Substantial evidence" is such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate 
to support a conclusion. 
39. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (1976); Securities & Exchange Com-
mission v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947). 
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and second, "special" weight is to be given to comments of persons 
directly affected by the rule. This modification in existing practice 
seems to require the allocation of added weight to economic con-
cerns, industry, and social costs. 
E. Regulatory Agendas 
Section 5 of the new Executive Order continues the practice begun 
in Executive Order 12,044 that agendas of proposed regulations that 
agencies have issued or expect to issue, and currently effective rules 
that are under agency review, be published biannually in the Federal 
Register.4o The Executive Order also authorizes OMB to require 
agencies to provide additional information41 in an agenda, and publi-
cation of the agenda in a specified format. 
F. The Task Force and Office of Management and Budget 
Although the title of section 6 prominently mentions the Task 
Force, there is only one reference to the Task Force in the entire sec-
tion, i.e., "the Director shall have authority, subject to the direction 
of the Task Force . . . ." The remainder of the section sets forth 
the specific authority of OMB, most of which has been discussed 
above. The Director is empowered to: 
• designate any proposed or existing rule as a major rule, 
• prepare and promulgate uniform standards for the identifica-
tion of major rules and the development of RIA's, 
• require an agency to evaluate any additional relevant data 
from any appropriate source, 
• identify duplicative, overlapping and conflicting rules; exist-
ing or proposed, and existing proposed rules that are incon-
sistent with the policies underlying statutes governing agen-
cies other than the issuing agencies or with the purpose of this 
order, and in each such case, require appropriate interagency 
consultation. [Emphasis supplied]. 
• develop procedures for estimating the annual benefits and 
costs of agency regulations, on both an aggregate and eco-
nomic or industrial sector basis, for purposes of compiling a 
regulatory budget, 
• in consultation with interested agencies, prepare for con-
sideration by the President recommendations for changes in 
the agencies' statutes, 
40. Exec. Order No. 12,291, S 5(a), 46 Fed. Reg. 13,195-96 (1981). 
41. The new Executive Order does not delineate what additional information OMB may re-
quire in an agenda. Presumably, what is meant is further information describing the intent and 
effect of a regulation. 
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• monitor agency compliance with the requirements of this 
Order and advise the President with respect to such compli-
ance. 42 
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While some of the previously described provisions relating directly 
to the process for promulgating regulations provided a glimpse of 
the pervasiveness of the review process to be undertaken by OMB, 
section 6 discloses fully the plan for revamping regulatory pro-
cedures. Its ambition, however, will only be fulfilled with significant 
investments of time and energy. However, the locus of authority in 
OMB may be the new administration's response to years of per-
ceived futility at achieving regulatory reform. Further, the involve-
ment of the Vice President, the Director of OMB, and the head of the 
Council of Economic Advisers as members of the Task Force may 
auger well for those critics who have attributed failure of regulatory 
reform to its lack of priority in former administrations. 
G. Pending Regulations 
The entirety of "Section 7, Pending Regulations" addresses the 
procedure for insuring reconsideration of every major rule pro-
mulgated by agencies in final form, but not yet effective (see Figure 
2). It requires "suspension or postponement" of the effective dates 
of all pending major rules, except: 
• major rules that cannot legally be postponed or suspended; 
• major rules that, for good cause, ought to become effective as 
final rules without reconsideration.48 
The second of these exceptions presumably requires a written 
justification of "good cause," with an ultimate review by OMB. It 
cannot yet be determined how this provision is to be reconciled with 
the President's January 29, 1981 Memorandum, entitled, "Post-
ponement of Pending Regulations,"44 except to say that that action 
is not superseded by the Executive Order, and that a cumulative 
postponement or suspension is likely. 
The specific procedural requirements of the section are divided in-
to procedures governing pending rules, interim rules, and final pro-
posed rules as follows: 
42. Exec. Order No. 12,291, S 6(a)(I}{8), 46 Fed. Reg. 13,196 (1981). 
43. [d. S 7(a)(I}{2), 46 Fed. Reg. 13,196 (1981). 
44. This memorandum postponed for 60 days the effective date of promulgation for both 
final rules and proposed final rules. 
FIG. 2. PROCEDURES FOR RECONSIDERATION OF PENDING/PROPOSED RULES UNDER EO 12,291 
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1. Pending Rules: Not To Be Reconsidered 
Agencies must report to OMB no later than fifteen days prior to 
the effective date of any rule that the agency has promulgated in 
final form as of the date of the Executive Order, and that has not yet 
become effective, and that will not be reconsidered: 
• that the rule is excepted from reconsideration, and the 
reasons; 
• that the rule is not a major rule. 45 
2. Director; Responsibilities Re: Pending Rules 
The Director of OMB is authorized, to the extent permitted by law, 
to: 
• require reconsideration of pending major rules; 
• designate a rule that an agency has issued in final form but not 
yet become effective as a major rule. 46 
3. Interim Rules 
Agencies may, in accordance with the Administrative Procedure 
Act, permit major rules that they have issued in final form, and that 
have not yet become effective, to take effect as interim rules, while 
they are being reconsidered, provided that, agencies shall report to 
OMB, no later than fifteen days before any such rule is proposed to 
take effect as an interim rule, that the rule should appropriately take 
effect as an interim rule while the rule is under reconsiderationY 
4. Proposed Final Rules; Not Yet Promulgated As Final Rule 
Agencies are required to report to OMB no later than thirty days 
prior to promulgating as a final rule any proposed rule that the agen-
cy has published or issued as of date of the Executive Order and that 
has not been considered under the terms of the Executive Order: 
• that the rule cannot be legally considered in accordance with 
the Executive Order, and a brief explanation of the legal 
reasons; 
• that the rule is not a major rule, in which cases the agency 
shall submit to OMB a copy of the proposed rule.48 
45. Exec. Order No. 12,291, § 7(b)(1)-(2), 46 Fed. Reg. 13,197 (1981). 
46. Id. § 7(c)(I)-(2), 46 Fed. Reg. 13,197. 
47. Id. § 7(d), 46 Fed. Reg. 13,197. 
48. Id. § 7(f)(1)-(2), 46 Fed. Reg. 13,197. 
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5. Director; Responsibilities Re: Proposed Final Rules 
The Director of OMB is authorized to: 
• require reconsideration; or 
• designate a proposed rule that an agency has published or 
issued (not yet as final rule) as a major rule. 49 
6. Compliance 
The Director of OMB shall be deemed to have found an agency's 
report to OMB consistent with the purpose of the Executive Order, 
unless he advises the agency to the contrary: 
• within 15 days of its report, in the case of any report relating 
to a published final rule not yet effective and any interim rule, 
• within 30 days of its report, in the case of any report relating 
to a published or issued proposed rule not yet promulgated as 
a final rule. 50 
Section 7 of the Executive Order may be characterized as a safety 
net preventing any proposed or pending final rule from becoming ef-
fective until it complies with the requirements of the Executive 
Order. This section effectively recaptures for reconsideration rules 
that would have become effective after meeting the standards in ex-
istence prior to issuance of the new Order. It tracks the same pro-
cedure delineated for new regulations but with shorter time frames 
for agency reporting and OMB response. Similarly, legal prohibition 
appears to be the only real excuse for not reconsidering pending or 
proposed final rules under the procedures contained in the Executive 
Order. 
H. Exemptions 
As cited throughout this summary, only two exemptions to the pro-
cedures of the Executive Order apply to major rules. These exemp-
tions include: 
• any regulation that responds to an emergency situtation, 
• any regulation for which consideration or reconsideration 
under the terms of the Executive Order would conflict with 
deadlines imposed by statute or by judicial order. 51 
In both instances, however, the exemptions are applicable only if 
49. [d. § 7(g)(1)-(2), 46 Fed. Reg. 13,197. 
50. [d. § 7(h)(1)-(2), 46 Fed. Reg. 13,197. 
51. [d. § 8(a)(1)-(2), 46 Fed. Reg. 13,198. 
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the pertinent regulations are reported to OMB, and explanations of 
the conditions warranting exemption are published in the Federal 
Register. In the case of emergency regulations the added require-
ment of preparation and submission of the RIA is included. For 
regulations in which deadlines are imposed by statute or by judicial 
order, consultation with OMB is required to determine to what ex-
tent compliance with the Order may be achieved. 
Another powerful authority vested in OMB is its ability, subject to 
the direction of the Task Force, to exempt any class or category of 
regulations from any or all requirements of the Executive Order. 
This assures a means of administrative flexibility so that favored 
regulations, which are not emergency rules or required by statute or 
judicial order, may be permitted to bypass the cumbersome review 
procedure. 
1. Judicial Review 
In an attempt to emphasize the internal managerial intent of the 
Executive Order and to minimize the likelihood of litigation challeng-
ing its diminution of agency authority; "Section 9, Judicial Review" 
contains the following disclaimer: 
This Order is intended only to improve the internal management 
of the Federal government, and is not intended to create any 
right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by 
a party against the United States, its agencies, its officers or 
any person. The determinations made by agencies under Section 
4 of this Order, and any Regulatory Impact Analyses for any 
rule, shall be made part of the whole record of agency action in 
connection with the rule. 62 
The effect of such a disclaimer is questionable, since most courts 
will look beyond the stated intent of an act to its de facto result. If, in 
practice, agency responsibilities have been usurped and redelegated 
without statutory authority, the Order must be invalidated. It seems 
certain, however, that litigation will follow. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The long-term effects of the new Executive Order will have to 
await the judgment of time. The degree of enforcement by the Office 
of Management and Budget, guidelines interpreting ambivalent pro-
52. [d. § 9, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,198. 
308 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 9:285 
visions, individual agency responses to its terms, and potentiallitiga-
tion may have a decidedly larger impact than anything we can now 
discern from the Order's technical terms. But what cannot be denied 
is that it significantly alters the approach toward government regu-
lation of business. It operates from a foundation of laissez-faire eco-
nomic activity. It demands that government prove by a preponder-
ance of the evidence the value of its intervention. 
What the Executive Order demonstrates is that balancing tests 
may be affected significantly by a variation in the weights assigned 
to the countervailing sides. The p'resident has effectively adjusted 
the regulatory process to accommodate his economic and political 
philosophy of government regulation of business. He has done so by 
adding an increased burden to those who must substantiate govern-
ment action, while simultaneously increasing the weight to be given 
to economic evidence and arguments opposing intervention. 
Administrative agencies, therefore, are compelled to follow a two-
staged preliminary decision-making process. First, they must deter-
mine that a clear legal authority to regulate an area which by all 
available evidence appears to necessitate government action is pres-
ent. Second, they must choose a course from the alternatives avail-
able that is the least costly and provides an aggregate net benefit to 
society. The elements of proof required and the standards to be met 
are defined in the Executive Order. It sets a new course for the divi-
sion of authority between federal agencies and OMB-a course set 
centrally at OMB. 
Finally, future interpretation-either administratively or judicially 
- must address the following questions: 
• Does the Executive Order inappropriately and illegally usurp 
agency (or congressional) authority? 
• Who will have "standing" to challenge the validity of the Ex-
ecutive Order, particularly with respect to OMB power to 
reverse agency head determinations of whether rules are 
"major" or "non-major?" 
• How will agencies with reductions in staff and cuts in budget 
prepare the quantity and quality of analyses required by the 
Order? 
• Will OMB become an "appeals court" for industry? 
• Will agencies revise methods for regulating certain conduct to 
insure that the least costly alternative is employed, or simply 
not regulate? 
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• Will agency heads over time develop an adversary role with 
OMB, and will the Task Force or President be the ultimate ar-
biter? 
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For the student and practitioner, the answers to these questions will 
make for an interesting future. 
